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Abstract
In this note, I try to accomplish two things. First, I fulfill Andrei
Khrennikov’s request that I comment on his “Va¨xjo¨ Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics,” contrasting it with my own present view of the
subject matter. Second, I try to paint an image of the hopeful vistas an
information-based conception of quantum mechanics indicates.
Andrei Khrennikov has asked me to make a few remarks contrasting my
view of the foundations of quantum mechanics to his view—something he calls
“The Va¨xjo¨ Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.” a I would certainly be
loath to let him down on this occasion, not least of all because of the time
and loving devotion he spent in organizing our beautiful 2001 midsummer’s
meeting in Va¨xjo¨. Indeed, those who know Andrei Khrennikov know that he
loves nothing better than a good fight! What better tribute might I offer him
than a playful article titled “The Anti-Va¨xjo¨ Interpretation?”
Still, the constraint imposed by a timely publication of this proceedings
volume makes it hard for me to do the job properly. In the present note I first
content myself to giving the reader a few pointers to some of the literature
that I think best captures my own view. Following that, I rely on the mode
of expression that flows so freely from me when I write a personal letter—but
never flows from me when I write a proper paper!—to give a brief survey of
what I deem to be the big picture of my efforts. Here goes.
First the pointers. Much of my own (forming) view of what is going on in
quantum mechanics is documented at my website:
http://netlib.bell-labs.com/who/cafuchs/
In particular, my most relevant (though wordy) document there is the one
titled “Quantum States: What the Hell Are They? (The Post-Va¨xjo¨ Phase
Transition)” Another important website (though some of the material there is
not completely in line with the way I see things) is the one of Carlton Caves:
http://info.phys.unm.edu/ c˜aves/
aSee A. Khrennikov, “Va¨xjo¨ Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” quant-ph/0202107.
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There, the most important file is the one titled “Resource Material for Pro-
moting the Bayesian View of Everything.”
Beyond that, let me recommend four other articles. The first two are the
most technically important for the enterprise I promote in my other contribu-
tion to this volume: Namely, to secure a transfer from our present abstract,
axiomatic formulation of quantum mechanics to a more physically meaningful
one. I think some elements in Lucien Hardy’s papers almost carry us to the
brink of that. In his work, I think the right emphasis is finally being placed
on the right mathematical structures. The papers are:
1. L. Hardy, “Quantum Theory From Five Reasonable Axioms,”
quant-ph/0101012.
2. L. Hardy, “Why Quantum Theory?,” quant-ph/0111068.
For its pleasant explanation of the similarities of the “measurement problem”
in classical physics and quantum physics, I recommend,
3. R. Duvenhage, “The Nature of Information in Quantum Mechanics,”
quant-ph/0203070.
Finally, Chris Timpson’s undergraduate(!) thesis deserves note for its emphasis
on the proper way to think about what the Church-Turing Thesis is an attempt
to formalize:
4. C. G. Timpson, “Information and the Turing Principle: Some Philosophi-
cal Considerations,” available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/ q˜uee0776/.
Getting ideas like that straight, I now believe, form the better part of the
uphill slope we must climb to understand quantum mechanics.
I should point out, however, that in all four of the above references, I think
significant improvements could be made by adopting a sufficiently Bayesian
stance toward the use and meaning of probability.
Now let me transfer attention to a set of personal letters I include in this
contribution. The first three were written to Andrei Khrennikov himself, and
have explicitly to do with the contrast between his views and mine. In a
nutshell, we both seem to believe that quantum mechanics has something to
do with setting “contexts” and seeing what unrolls from that. Where we seem
to disagree, however, is in what that has to do with “probability.”
The final two letters—the actual heart of this paper—were written to John
Preskill and William Wootters, each in turn. These address various broader
themes that I think best set the tone for my present research efforts.
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1 28 June 2001, to Khrennikov, “Context Dependent Probability”
Khrennikovism 1 : It was nice to meet you in Va¨xjo¨ and discuss fundamen-
tal problems of quantum theory. Unfortunetely, I have the impression that my
presentation on Contextual Probabilistic Interpretation of quantum theory was
not so clear for participants (conversations during lunches and dinners). I try
to present my views as short and clear as possible.
Thank you for valuing my opinion on your ideas; I am flattered. So
I treated the problem in a conscientious manner: I downloaded and read
three of your papers (quant-ph/0103065, quant-ph/0105059, and quant-ph/
0106073).
I am indeed quite intrigued by the possibility that quantum mechanics may
be nothing more than a calculus for comparing probabilities when the exper-
imental context cannot be deleted from the results it brings about. In vague
philosophical terms, I think this is precisely the kind of idea Bohr, Heisenberg,
and Pauli were bandying about in constructing their interpretation of quantum
mechanics. It is certainly the kind of notion Bohr was trying to get at with
his emphasis on “complementarity.” So I would welcome a more precise way
(a mathematical way) of expressing the essence of all this. I myself have been
attracted to this sort of thing for a long time: it is a large part of the thread
connecting my “Notes on a Paulian Idea” b—that is, that the observer sets the
context, and, in the words of Pauli, cannot be “detached” from what he finds.
Also you can find discussions of it in Sections 4 and 8 of the large paper I was
circulating at the conference, “Quantum Foundations in the Light of Quantum
Information.” c I say all this to make it clear that I am more than sympathetic
to your program.
However, as much as I would like to tell you otherwise (because you are
my friend), I do not see that your present formulation of the problem moves
very far toward quantum mechanics in a convincing way. There are problems
on at least two levels.
Maybe the most devastating and immediate is your move between Eqs.
(5) and (6) of quant-ph/0106073. (I’ll focus on that paper for specificity since
I did not see you make a stronger argument in either of the other two papers.)
You write:
The perturbation term δ(S,S ′) depends on absolute magnitudes of
bSee C. A. Fuchs, “Notes on a Paulian Idea: Foundational, Historical, Anecdotal & Forward-
Looking Thoughts on the Quantum (Selected Correspondence),” quant-ph/0105039.
cSee C. A. Fuchs, “Quantum Foundations in the Light of Quantum Information,” quant-ph/
0106166.
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probabilities. It would be natural to introduce normalized coeffi-
cient of the context transition . . .
The question anyone will ask is, “Why is this natural?” What compels the
precise form of the normalization other than that it forces the equation to look
of a more quantum mechanical form. Why did you choose the square root
rather than the third root, say? Indeed, why not divide by the absolute value
of δ, or the exponential of δ, or any other combination of functions one could
pull out of a hat? To put it not so gently, it looks as if you built the desired
answer in at the outset, with little justification otherwise.
The second level of my problem is that, even if you do get this far, how do
you make the further step to vector space representations of quantum mechan-
ics? Why are observables POVMs and not other exotic entities? What leads
us to the starting point of Gleason’s theorem? Etc., etc.? I don’t see that you
have enough structure to do that. But more importantly, until you have done
that I would have to say that your theory remains fairly empty in making a
connection to quantum mechanics. Too empty.
The way I view the problem presently is that, indeed, quantum theory
is a theory of contextual probabilities. This much we agree on: within each
context, quantum probabilities are nothing more than standard Kolmogoro-
vian probabilities. But the contexts are set by the structure of the Positive
Operator-Valued Measures: one experimental context, one POVM. The glue
that pastes the POVMs together into a unified Hilbert space is Gleason’s
“noncontextuality assumption”: where two POVMs overlap, the probability
assignments for those outcomes must not depend upon the context. Putting
those two ideas together, one derives the structure of the quantum state. The
quantum state (uniquely) specifies a compendium of probabilities, one for each
context. And thus there are transformation rules for deriving probabilities in
one context from another. This has the flavor of your program. But getting
to that starting point from more general considerations—as you would like to
do (I think)—is the challenge I haven’t yet seen fulfilled.
I very much hope that I have not offended you with these comments. I
greatly respect your program. But because of that I want much from it. I want
it to stretch our understanding. John Wheeler used to say, “We must make
as many mistakes as we can, as fast as we can, or we’ll never have a hope of
gaining a true understanding!” I let that philosophy rule my research life. Thus
I can only commend you for your exploration, and hold the strongest hope that
something firm will come from it with a little more work and contemplation.
2 4 July 2001, to Khrennikov, “Invitation”
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Khrennikovism 2 : Yes, this is very well! However, for me, the only bridge
between “reality” and our subjective description is given by relative frequencies.
But there other ways to make the bridge: this is what gambling situations
(like the Dutch-book argument that Ru¨diger Schack spoke about) d are about.
They give a nonfrequency operational definition to probabilities. Subjective
probabilities make their OBJECTIVE mark on the world by specifying how
an agent should act when confronted with them.
3 4 July 2001, to Khrennikov, “Context Dependent Subjective
Probability”
Khrennikovism 3 : P.S. But! How can you unify contextuality with subjec-
tive probability?
I just don’t see this as a problem. In choosing one experiment over another,
I choose one context over another. The experiment elicits the world to do
something. To say that the world is indeterministic means simply that I cannot
predict with certainty what it will do in response to my action. Instead, I say
what I can in the form of a probability assignment. My probability assignment
comes about from the information available to me (how the system reacted in
other contexts, etc., etc.). Similarly for you, even though your information
may not be the same as mine. The OBJECTIVE content of the probability
assignment comes from the fact that no one can make tighter predictions
for the outcomes of experiments than specified by the quantum mechanical
laws. Or to say it still another way, it is the very existence of transformation
rules from one context to another that expresses an objective content for the
theory. Those rules apply to me as well as to you, even though our probability
assignments within each context may be completely different (because they
are subjective). But, if one of us follows the proper transformation rules—
the quantum rules—for going to one context from another, while the other of
us does not, then one of us will be able to take advantage of the other in a
gambling match. The one of us that ignores the structure of the world will be
bitten by it!
4 18 February 2002, to Preskill, “Psychology 101”
Let me reply to some of your points in a way that doesn’t reflect their original
order.
dSee C. M. Caves, “Betting Probabilities and the Dutch Book,” at http://info.phys.unm.
edu/ c˜aves/reports/reports.html.
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Preskillism 1 : In the past I have sensed that you and I differ in how we
regard ourselves. I believe that I am just another physical system governed by
the same fundamental laws as any other system. You seem to think there is a
fundamental distinction between yourself and the system you are observing. To
me the Everett view is appealing because it turns away from this egocentrism.
It’s funny, but when I read this, my reaction went in two rather peculiar
directions. First I thought, “I wonder if, in the end, the only thing the great
quantum foundations struggles will leave behind is a few psychological obser-
vations? If so, what a shame.” But secondly, I imagined Galileo hoisting me
up to the top of the Leaning Tower of Pisa and dropping me off it along with
his two famous stones. Even though I cursed and screamed the whole way
down, I went “splat” at the same time that they went “thud.”
Here’s the psychological thought in a little more detail. One of the things
that bugs me about the Everett view is what I consider its extreme egocen-
trism! Now, how can that be—both of us accusing the other’s view as the
egocentric view? I’ll tell you what I think, trying to express the problem from
both sides of the fence.
My side gets to go first. What I find egocentric about the Everett point
of view is the way it purports to be a means for us little finite beings to get
outside the universe and imagine what it is doing as a whole. And what is
it doing as a whole? Something fantastic? Something almost undreamable?!
Something inexpressible in the words of man?!?! Nope. It’s conforming to a
scheme some guy dreamed up in the 1950s.
This whole fantastic universe can be boiled down to something repre-
sentable within one of its most insignificant components—the brain of man.
Even toying with that idea, strikes me as an egocentrism beyond belief. The
universe makes use of no principle that cannot already be stuffed into the head
of an average PhD in physics? The chain of logic that leads to the truth of
the four-color theorem (apparently) can’t be stuffed into our heads, but the
ultimate operating principle for all that “is” and “can be” can?
It’s a funny thing: I don’t think I’ve met anyone who would imagine that
mathematics will ever come to an end. Or even that it can come to an end.
There’ll always be new axiom sets to play with, new formal structures to write
down. But with physics it’s a completely different story. People are always
wanting to say, “Well we’ve finally gotten there.” Or, “Even though we’re not
there, we’re pretty damned close.” It’s OK, even condoned, to have Dreams
of a Final Theory. From this point of view, all the mathematics yet to come is
worthless as far as the essence of the universe goes; the wad was already shot.
You get the point. It’s a psychological one, but it’s one that I find over-
whelmingly powerful. It is that anytime any of us ever has the chutzpah to say,
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“Here’s an ultimate statement about reality,” or even a potentially ultimate
one, what we’re really doing is painting the world in the image of man. We’re
saying that the measly concepts we’ve managed to develop up to this point in
time fit the world in a way that none of our previous concepts have, that none
in the future will ever do better, and, most importantly, we view this not as
a statement about ourselves and the situation set by our present evolutionary
and intellectual stage, but rather as a property of the universe itself.
Now let me start moving toward the other side of the fence. The question
someone like me—someone who has these kinds of blasphemous thoughts—has
to ask himself is, how can I ever hope to be a scientist in spite of all this? What
can science and all the great achievements it has given rise to in the last 400
years be about if one chooses to suspend one’s dreams of a final theory at the
very outset? (Or, to tribute Johnny [Wheeler], how can one have law without
law?)
I think the solution is in nothing other than holding firmly—absolutely
firmly—to the belief that we, the scientific agents, are physical systems in
essence and composition no different than much of the rest of the world. But
if we do hold firmly to that—in a way that I do not see the Everettistas holding
to it—we have to recognize that what we’re doing in the game of science is
swimming in the thick middle of things. We’re swimming in this undulant sea,
and doing our best to keep our heads above the water: All the concepts that
arise in a physical theory must be interpreted to do with points of view we can
construct from within the world.
That is to say, we have to loosen the idea that a physical law is a mirror
image of what “is” in the world, and replace it with something that expresses
instead how each of us can best cope with and hope to take advantage of the
world exterior to ourselves. This, it seems to me, is something that by its very
definition can be stuffed into the human brain. The current state of science is
our presently best known means for survival. A scientific theory indeed, from
this point of view, is yet another expression of Darwinian principles. Scientific
theories evolve and survive because the survivors have a kind of staying power
that none of the rest of the competition have. Not because they are part of
the blueprint of the universe.
The situation of quantum mechanics—I become ever more convinced—
illustrates this immersion of the scientific agent in the world more clearly than
any physical theory contemplated to date. That is because it tells you you have
to strain really hard and strip away most of the theory’s operational content,
most of its workaday usefulness, to make sense of it as a reflection of “what is”
(independent of the agent) and—importantly—you insist on doing that for all
the terms in the theory.
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I know you’re going to find the last sentence debatable, but that is what
I see as the danger in the Everett point of view: You are able—or at least
purportedly so—to view the universal state as a reflection of something, but
at the cost of deleting all the concrete things it was meant to reflect in the first
place. What I mean by this is, if we take any concrete situation in quantum
mechanics—a system, a measuring device, and some kind of model for the
beginning stages of a measurement—we can indeed construct a Church-of-the-
Larger-Hilbert space description of it. I’ll grant you that. But try to go the
other way around without any foreknowledge of the “measurement”: Start
with the Church, and try to derive from it that a concrete measurement has
taken place, and you encounter an embarrassment of riches. You don’t know
how to identify the valid worlds, etc., etc. (And, if you ask me, invoking
decoherence as a cure-all is little more than a statement of faith that some guy
in Los Alamos has the all the answers to all the tough questions the rest of us
are too lazy to work out.)
So, I myself am left with a view of quantum mechanics for which the
main terms in the theory—the quantum states—express nothing more than the
gambling commitments I’m willing to make at any moment. When I encounter
various other pieces of the world, if I am rational—that is to say, Darwinian-
optimal—I should use the stimulations those pieces give me to reevaluate my
commitments. This is what quantum state change is about. The REALITY of
the world I am dealing with is captured by two things in the present picture:
1. I posit systems with which I find myself having encounters, and
2. I am not able to see in a deterministic fashion the stimulations (call
them measurement outcomes, if you like) those systems will give me—
something comes into me from the outside that takes me by surprise.
OK, now let me put myself squarely in your pasture. You worry that hav-
ing those main terms in the theory refer to my (or your, or Joe Buck’s) e gam-
bling commitments, is committing a kind of egocentrism. What respectable
theory would refer to my particular vices, my desires, my bank account in
making its most important statements?
This is going to surprise you now, but I agree with you wholeheartedly.
Even enthusiastically so. Where I seem to disagree is that I do not find this a
good reason to promote those vices, those commitments to an unearthly realm
and call them “states of the universe” (or relative states therein). Instead, it
seems to me to be a call to recognize them for what they are and to redouble
our efforts for getting at the real nub of the matter.
eSee pages 125 and 156 of quant-ph/0105039.
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Let me try to give you a way of thinking about this that you might respect.
What was Einstein’s greatest achievement in getting at general relativity? For
the purposes of the present exposition, I would say it was in his recognizing that
the “gravitational field” one feels in an accelerating elevator is just a coordinate
effect—it is something that is induced purely with respect to the description of
an observer. In this light, the program of trying to develop general relativity
thus boiled down to trying to recognize all the things within gravitational and
motional phenomena that should be viewed as consequences of our coordinate
choices. Or to use a phrase I’ve come to like, it was in identifying all the things
that can be viewed as “numerically additional” to the observer-free situation
which come about purely by bringing the observer (scientific agent, coordinate
system, etc.) onto the scene.
Now the point is, that was a really useful process. For in weeding out
all the things that can be viewed as “merely” coordinate effects, the fruit left
behind could be seen in a clear view for the first time: It was the Riemannian
manifold that we call spacetime.
What I dream for in my foundational program for quantum mechanics is
something just about like that. Weed out all the terms that have to do with
gambling commitments (I used to call it information, knowledge, or belief),
and what is left behind will play a role much like Einstein’s manifold.
This much of the program, I hope and suspect you will understand even if
you are not sympathetic to it. But, I don’t know, you might be sympathetic to
it. (Especially if I’ve done a good job above.) However, it is also true that you
have rightly suspected some tendencies in me that go further. In particular,
in opposition to the picture of general relativity, where reintroducing the co-
ordinate system—i.e., reintroducing the observer—changes nothing about the
manifold (it only tells us what kind of sensations the observer will pick up), I
do not suspect the same of the quantum world. This is why I recommend to
all my friends that they read William James’s little article “The Sentiment of
Rationality.” f It sort of sets the right mindset, even though it has nothing
to do with quantum mechanics (other than in the efficacy of taking gambles)
and goes much further on religion than I myself would go.
Anyway, here I suspect that reintroducing the observer will be more like
introducing matter into pure spacetime, rather than simply gridding it off with
a coordinate system. “Matter tells spacetime how to curve when it is there,
and spacetime tells matter how to move when it is there.” Observers, scientific
agents, a necessary part of reality? No. But do they tend to change things
fW. James, “The Sentiment of Rationality,” in The Writings of William James: A Compre-
hensive Edition, edited with an introduction by J. J. McDermott (Modern Library, Random
House, New York, 1967), pp. 317–345.
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once they are on the scene. Yes. Or at least that’s the idea.
Does that mean that the scientific agent is something outside of physical
law? Well, to give this an answer, you’ve got to go back and be very careful to
use the picture of “physical law” that I built up at the beginning of the essay.
What we are “governed” by, God only knows. He’s the one, if anyone, who
sits outside the physical universe and has a chance to look back at it whenever
he pleases. Our task is to build up as good and solid a set of beliefs as we
can from within it. In that way, we increase our survival power, and use our
spare time to try to bring forth a few progeny of our own. (I used the word
“governed,” by the way, because you had used it above.)
If Galileo had dropped me from the tower, I feel pretty confident that I
would have gone splat.
5 25 February 2002, to Wootters, “A Wonderful Life”
Thanks for the two notes, and wow, thanks for reading the James essay. Your
questions were anything but naive. In fact, they were much needed. In trying
to answer them, I think I significantly clarified—to myself even!—what I’m
hoping to get at. Besides, I certainly don’t have a final stand yet; the whole
point of view is in the process of formation and questions like yours really help.
I’ll do my best to reply to your questions below, and in the process I think
I’ll finally compose what I’ve been wanting to say about your “private-world-
within-entanglement” musings. At the end of the note, I’ll list some of the
open questions on my mind. (These are likely to be the naive ones!)
Woottersism 1 : Of course I’m very sympathetic to the perspective you ex-
press in this paragraph . . . but couldn’t one still argue that as a matter of
methodology, the tactic of pretending that we can know the whole story has
served science well? We make up a model of the world, and this model gives
us something to shoot at. We hang on to the model until we have found an
explicit flaw in it (other than the flaw of hubris). And then we move on to a
new model.
I find this an interesting question. On the one hand, I think this strategy
does work well in advancing science. On the other hand, scientists (and others)
are much too prone to accept as true the pragmatic lie that says we can fully
understand the world.
Your note to John [Preskill] goes some way toward laying out an alternative
methodology. You speak of science in Darwinian terms: the most successful
theories survive. How then do we proceed as scientists? I suppose the answer
is that we still make up theories and test them, but the theories are not tentative
descriptions of the world. Rather, theories are schemes for making predictions.
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But you obviously also want to say that our theories tell us something about
reality, even if they are not descriptions of reality. Moreover, our theories will
tell us more about reality if we identify and remove from them those aspects
that are subjective. So your view of science is not entirely operational. There
is realism in the background.
Have I understood you correctly?
Yes there is certainly a kind of realism working in the back of my mind,
if what you mean by “realism” is that one can imagine a world which never
gives rise to man or sentience of any kind. This, from my view, would be a
world without science, for there would be no scientific agents theorizing within
it. This is what I mean by realism: That man is not a priori the be-all and
end-all of the world. (The qualification “a priori” is important and I’ll come
back to it later.)
A quick consequence of this view is that I believe I eschew all forms of
idealism. Instead, I would say all our evidence for the reality of the world
comes from without us, i.e., not from within us. We do not hold evidence
for an independent world by holding some kind of transcendental knowledge.
Nor do we hold it from the practical and technological successes of our past
and present conceptions of the world’s essence. It is just the opposite. We
believe in a world external to ourselves precisely because we find ourselves
getting unpredictable kicks (from the world) all the time. If we could predict
everything to the final T as Laplace had wanted us to, it seems to me, we
might as well be living a dream.
To maybe put it in an overly poetic and not completely accurate way, the
reality of the world is not in what we capture with our theories, but rather
in all the stuff we don’t. To make this concrete, take quantum mechanics
and consider setting up all the equipment necessary to prepare a system in
a state Π and to measure some noncommuting observable H . (In a sense,
all that equipment is just an extension of ourselves and not so very different
in character from a prosthetic hand.) Which eigenstate of H we will end up
getting as our outcome, we cannot say. We can draw up some subjective
probabilities for the occurrence of the various possibilities, but that’s as far
as we can go. (Or at least that’s what quantum mechanics tells us.) Thus, I
would say, in such a quantum measurement we touch the reality of the world
in the most essential of ways.
With that said, I now want to be very careful to distance this conception of
reality, from what I’m seeking in the foundation game of quantum mechanics.
Here’s the way I originally put it to John [Preskill] the other day. Let me
repeat a good bit of it so that it’s at the top of your mind:
OK, now let me put myself squarely in your pasture. You worry
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that having those main terms in the theory refer to my (or your,
or Joe Buck’s) gambling commitments, is committing a kind of
egocentrism. What respectable theory would refer to my particular
vices, my desires, my bank account in making its most important
statements?
This is going to surprise you now, but I agree with you whole-
heartedly. Even enthusiastically so. Where I seem to disagree is
that I do not find this a good reason to promote those vices, those
commitments to an unearthly realm and call them “states of the
universe” (or relative states therein). Instead, it seems to me to
be a call to recognize them for what they are and to redouble our
efforts for getting at the real nub of the matter. . . .
What I dream for in my foundational program for quantum
mechanics is something just about like that. Weed out all the
terms that have to do with gambling commitments (I used to call
it information, knowledge, or belief), and what is left behind will
play a role much like Einstein’s manifold.
This much of the program, I hope and suspect you will under-
stand even if you are not sympathetic to it. . . . However, it is also
true that you have rightly suspected some tendencies in me that
go further. In particular, in opposition to the picture of general
relativity, where reintroducing the coordinate system—i.e., rein-
troducing the observer—changes nothing about the manifold (it
only tells us what kind of sensations the observer will pick up), I
do not suspect the same of the quantum world. . . .
Anyway, here I suspect that reintroducing the observer will be
more like introducing matter into pure spacetime, rather than sim-
ply gridding it off with a coordinate system. “Matter tells space-
time how to curve when it is there, and spacetime tells matter how
to move when it is there.” Observers, scientific agents, a necessary
part of reality? No. But do they tend to change things once they
are on the scene. Yes. Or at least that’s the idea.
From some of my choices of words, I think you probably got the impression
that this thing—this structure within quantum mechanics—that I’m hoping
to find at the end of the day is meant to be a model of “reality.” Or at least
our “current best guess” of what reality is. But no, that’s not really what I
want. And your questions helped make that much clearer to me. Remember,
for me, the mark of reality is its indescribability.
What I’m asking for instead is something like what one finds in the old
movie, It’s a Wonderful Life. That is to say, in our scientific theories, we codify
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some fraction of what we know about manipulating the world and conditionally
predicting the phenomena about us. However, suppose we wanted to get at
a measure of our place in the world. How would we quantify it, or at least
qualify it? That is, how might we ask how important our lives and agential
actions are with respect to the theory we ourselves laid out?
Our only tool, of course, is the theory; for it defines the frame for optimal
thinking (and imagination) at any given moment. We can only gauge our
measure by deleting the free variable that is ourselves and seeing what is left
behind. You surely remember what George Bailey found when his guardian
angel granted his wish in It’s a Wonderful Life. He found that his life mattered.
So too is what I suspect we will find in quantum mechanics.
But all of that is the sort of thing I won’t be able to say in a conference
presentation for quite some time. It’s the sort of thing that we discussed once
before, in the context of some Jamesian quote. g It’s the underground reason
for the philosophy.
At the level of convincing our peers, let me put it to you this way. Within
quantum mechanics, there is an invariant piece which is common to all of us
by the very fact of our accepting the theory. That is what we are in search
of because in some sense—which need not pertain to a realistic conception
of a theory’s correspondence to nature—it is the core of the theory. It is
the single part that we agree upon, even when we agree upon nothing else.
In the direction I am seeking to explore, the quantum state is “numerically
gIn particular I was thinking about this quote of William James:
The history of philosophy is to a great extant that of a certain clash of
human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some of
my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a good
many of the divergencies of philosophies by it. Of whatever temperament a
professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of
his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he
urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really
gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It
loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making a more sentimental
or more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle
would. He trusts his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes
in any representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of opposite
temper to be out of key with the world’s character, and in his heart considers
them incompetent and ‘not in it,’ in the philosophic business, even though they
may far excel him in dialectical ability.
Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his tem-
perament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises thus a certain
insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest of all our premises is
never mentioned. I am sure it would contribute to clearness if in these lectures
we should break this rule and mention it, and I accordingly feel free to do so.
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additional” to that core. (That is, the quantum state is a compendium of
Bayesian “beliefs” or “gambling commitments” and is thus susceptible to the
type of analysis James gives in his “Sentiment of Rationality.” Our particular
choice of a quantum state is something extra that we carry into the world.)
I hope that clears up some of the mystery of my thoughts for you—it did
for me. Given John’s implicit acceptance of the idea that “a true theory is a
mirror image of nature,” I should not have said in my note that I agreed with
him “wholeheartedly.” I do not intend for any part of the formal structure of
quantum mechanics to be a mirror image of nature (in the sense of a proposed
final theory). However, I do not intend to give up the reality of our world
either.
From my point of view, the only “true” reality that creeps into quantum
mechanics is “in the differential”—i.e., in the changes we induce upon our
(personal) quantum states for this and that due to any stimuli we give to or
take from the outside world. That, however, is a pretty amorphous thing as
theoretical entities go. It is little more than what might have been called in
older language, the measurement “click.”
There is a temptation to go further—to say that the POVM element Eb
associated with a measurement outcome b is itself an element of reality. But
I think that has to be resisted at all costs. There are several arguments one
can use to show that the ascription of a particular POVM to a measurement
phenomenon is a subjective judgment at the same level of subjectivity as the
quantum state itself. (In fact the two go hand in hand, one cannot support
the subjectivity of the quantum state without also taking the subjectivity of
the POVM.) Instead, one should view the (theoretical) ascription of a POVM
to an actual measurement device as an attempt to set the significance and
meaning of the “click” it elicits. Similarly for the Krausian quantum operation
associated with the measurement: It describes the subjective judgment we use
for updating our quantum-state assignment in the light of the “click.” (If you
want more details about these arguments, I can forward you some of my old
write-ups on the subject.)
So, you probably ask by now, “What does that leave for the core of the
theory? Aren’t you throwing away absolutely everything?” And the answer
is, “No, I don’t think so.” Let me give you an example of something which I
think is left behind. Recall my favorite argument for why the quantum state
cannot be an element of reality—it’s the Einstein argument I wrote about in
Section 3 of my NATO paper. Once I posit a state for a bipartite system, even
though by my own admission my actions are purely local, a measurement on
one of the systems can toggle the quantum state of the other to a large range of
possibilities. Thus, I say that the quantum state of the far-away system cannot
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be more than my information or the compendium of subjective judgments I’m
willing to ascribe to that system.
Notice, however, that in positing the original state, I had to also implicitly
posit a tensor-product space for the bipartite system. Let me ask you this:
Once this tensor-product space is set, is there any way to toggle one of the
factors from afar just as with the quantum state? As far as I can tell there
is not. Thus I would say that the Hilbert space of the far-away system is a
candidate for part of the theory’s core. Well, the Hilbert space—once the choice
of a particular quantum state within it is excluded—really carries no substance
beyond its dimensionality d. Thus, in a more refined way of speaking, what
I really mean to say is that when I posit a quantum system, I am allowed to
also posit a characteristic property of it. It is a property that can be captured
by a single integer d.
There are some other things which I can argue will be “left behind” in
such an analysis, but I don’t want to clutter this note too much. Mainly I
presented the example above so that I could give you a clearer sense of how I
want to draw a distinction between the rawest forms of “reality” (the surprises
the world gives us) and the “core of a theory.”
It is the core of the theory (along with the theory as a whole) that I am
starting to view in Darwinian terms. But don’t we have every right to posit
that core as a property of the world itself, at least as long as that belief serves
us well? This, as you point out, has been the predominant image of what
science is about heretofore.
The only answer I can give you is “yes, we can” (just as indeed we have
heretofore). So, your point is well-founded. What I am worried about is
whether we should posit it so.h You say that this view has guided science well
hHere is the way I put it to Henry Folse when he asked, “Every attempt to sketch a conception
of the universe from our best theories at any date in human history in effect commits such
arrogance. Were the Newtonians of the end of the seventeenth century being “egocentric”
to think that Sir Isaac had done nothing less than peer into the mind of the Divine and
discerned God’s blueprints for the universe?”:
Yes. (In my opinion.) And you might interpret James and pragmatism in
general as a reaction to that. However, I think in our modern age with quantum
mechanics we have a motivation and opportunity in front of us that James did
not have. Try to give quantum mechanics a naive realist interpretation—you
can do it, or at least both Everett and Bohm tell us we can—and you find
yourself contorting yourself beyond belief. It’s as if nature is telling us for the
first time, “Please don’t interpret me in a naive realist fashion. I can’t stop
you, but please don’t.”
Folse, by the way, points out that what I really mean here is Cartesian representational
realism—that reality is as we represent it mathematically in our theories—rather than naive
realism.
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in the past. But how do you know? In a world with a view that there is no
ultimate law, how do you know that we would not be a thousand years more
advanced if we had only better appreciated our role as the substratum of our
theories? I think it boils down to the difference between an active and passive
view of what existence is about. Or maybe the difference between a positive
and a negative view.
To make this point, let me try to put things back into the context of regular
Darwinian evolution. Consider the word “elephant.” Does it denote anything
that exists in a kind of timeless sense, in a way that we usually think—or in
my case, previously thought—of physical theories as existing? If the concept
of an elephant is worthy of treating as a candidate for an element of reality,
then so too will a theory’s core.
Well, if we have bought into Darwinism in any serious way, then I would
say, no, there is nothing particularly timeless about the concept of an elephant.
There was once a chance that it might not even arise in the world. The
“elephant” is merely a function of the selective pressures that cropped up in
our world’s particular history. And, ashes to ashes, dust to dust, the poor
elephant may eventually disappear from the face of the universe, just like so
many species that arose in the course of evolution only to be never discovered
by a single archeologist.
But now, contrast the evolution of the elephant with the possible future
evolution of the human species. The elephant was an accident pure and simple,
from the strictly Darwinian view. But I would be hard pressed to apply pure
Darwinism to the future of mankind. The birth of my oldest daughter, for
instance was no accident. Her traits were selected based on personal visions
that both her mother and I had for the future. Similarly, but not so excitingly,
with the golden retriever, and all our other domesticated species. The key point
is that in the present stage of evolutionary development, we have it within our
power to move beyond strict Darwinism. This is what our industry of genetic
engineering is all about.
However, we would have never gotten to this stage if we had not first
realized that the concept of a species is not immutable. As strange—and as
crazy and as scary—as it may sound, this is where my thoughts are starting
to roam with physical theories. This does not mean, however, that we can
have exactly what we want with our physical theories—that they themselves
are little more than dreams. Just as the genetic engineer can make a million
viruses that will never have a chance of surviving on their own, there is more
to the story than our whims and fancies: There is the ever-present selective
pressure from the outside. But that does not delete the genetic engineer’s
ability to make something that was never here before.
16
But now, I go far, far, far beyond what I needed to say to answer all your
questions. Mainly, I just wanted to emphasize why I intentionally placed the
words “a priori” in my definition of reality way above.
I fear now slightly that you’re going to realize I’m one of the craziest people
you’ve ever met! And, trust me, I’m not sure I really believe all that I said in
the last three paragraphs. But it does strike me as a productive, or at least
hopeful, train of thought that someone ought to explore. I guess I offer myself
as the sacrifice.
— — — — —
There. I think that’s enough of my going around your questions in a rather
wide way. Let me now zoom back to the center of one of them for purposes of
a final emphasis.
Woottersism 2 : But you obviously also want to say that our theories tell us
something about reality, even if they are not descriptions of reality.
I hope you can glean from all the above that I do indeed believe our
theories tell us something about reality. But that something is much like what
the elephant tells us about reality. It’s presence tells us something about the
accumulated selective pressures that have arisen up to the present date. A
theory to some extent is a statement of history. It is also a statement of our
limitations with respect to all the pressures yet seen, or—more carefully—a
statement of our limitations with respect to our imaginations for classifying all
that we’ve yet seen. (I for instance, cannot jump off the leaning tower of Pisa
unprotected and hope to live; you, for instance, cannot get into your car and
hope to push on the accelerator until you are traveling beyond the speed of
light.) Finally, to the extent that we the theory users are part of nature, the
theory also tells us something about nature in that way.
But for any theory, there is always something outside of it. Or at least
that’s the idea I’m trying to build.
PS. Way above, I said I would finally say a few words about your “private-
world-within-entanglement” musings. But somehow it didn’t quite fit in with
the flow of the rest of what I wanted to say. So, let me try to present the
statement in isolation. From my point of view, the quantum state, and with
it entanglement, never pierces into the quantum system for which we posit a
parameter d (the “dimension”). Similarly for any bipartite system for which
we posit two parameters d1 and d2. The quantum state is only about what
I’m willing to bet will be the consequences when I reach out and touch a
system. Otherwise, indeed, a quantum system denotes a private world unto
itself. And similarly with bipartite systems. We have very little right to say
much of anything about the goings-on of their insides. (This part of the picture
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is something I’ve held firmly for a long time; it even shows up in my Physics
Today article with Asher Peres.)
PPS. I also promised to end with some open questions. But I’m petered out
now. And if you’ve gotten this far, you’re probably exhausted too. So I’ll
just leave it for the future, depending upon how interesting you find the ideas
above, or how much you think they’re nonsense!
6 Acknowledgements
I thank Jeff Bub, Henry Folse, Bas van Fraassen, Julio Gea-Banacloche, Lucien
Hardy, David Mermin, John Preskill, Terry Rudolph, and Bill Wootters for
saying things that encouraged me—whether they wanted them to or not—to
make these letters more public than usual.
18
